Before the Enlightenment, philosophers were relatively optimistic about the ability to perceive objects as they really are. Grappling with the essences of things was no easy task, to be sure, and reasoning the "whatness" of objects was a defining characteristic of classical philosophy - but for the most part our ability to rightly perceive the phenomena of objects in the world was taken for granted. During the Enlightenment, the primacy of metaphysics gave way to the primacy of epistemology, where the act of perceiving itself became an object of scrutiny. Immanuel Kant famously criticized the idea of empirical observation as providing the guiding principles of rationality suggesting instead that the categories which exist inside the mind predetermine our observations of objects in the world. From this standpoint the object doesn't simply impress itself on the mind, the mind actively discerns the object through its own (mostly reliable) categories. If that's true, as the Enlightenment project has assumed, it makes the ideal knowledge one in which nothing comes between the vision of a knower and the thing known. This is true even of Kant, since he believed that though the world in itself (outside of perception) could not be known, our minds are still hooked up to the world in a way that speaks truly about objects. Mark Bowald says:
"Objectivity" came to connote the character of the epistemological stance a person assumes while struggling to seek out knowledge of things in their epistemological opacity. That stance is viewed as being, ideally, unaffected by prior beliefs or judgments - in some sense 'neutral' or apart from any particular 'perspective'.This observation is crucial to the definition of objectivity. It speaks, first and foremost, of a person's impartial disposition toward objects . Moreover this is said to be a necessary disposition in order to arrive at truth. Put another way, true knowledge necessarily involves eliminating (or mitigating) one's own subjective states, such as emotions, judgments, desires, past experiences, etc., from consideration, since all of these things cloud the vision of the knower. If one is to be objective, he or she must yield to the brute facts which present themselves through impartial observation. Once supporting evidence can be marshaled to bolster a claim, it can be called "objective knowledge".
When it comes to reading the Bible it can be argued that Biblical scholarship has carried on according to this definition as well. Exegetes are those who come to the text suspending subjective factors as much as possible, and neutrally allowing the text to guide them wherever it may as it yields to the scientific tools of the exegete, namely grammar, archeology, history, etc. The data mined from their research is then handed off to Biblical theologians who assemble their objective observations into coherent building blocks which can add to the systematic theologian's overarching picture of what the Bible teaches. The inappropriateness felt by any reversal of this process testifies to the struggle for knowledge as a value-free enterprise. Any exegesis which emerges from theology is subjective, and thus illegitimate. Theology which arises from exegesis remains the only gold standard for what can count as true knowledge of the Bible.
Subsequent posts will evaluate that picture, but first I wanted to throw it out there for your reflection and modification. A few interesting questions to ask might be:
"Does it really work this way?" Do exegetes operate with neutrality and suspended judgment?
"Should it work this way?" Is impartiality a Biblical virtue in interpretation? Are there moral implications of objectivity?
"Did the apostles interpret Scripture this way?" Was their use of Scripture just an arbitrary product of ecstatic revelation which ran counter to how God wants Christians to read Scripture today?
"Are these our only options?" Does one have to approach the text "objectively" or be doomed to approach it "subjectively", or is there another way of looking at literary knowledge?
7 comments:
"Does it really work this way?" Do exegetes operate with neturality and suspended judgment?
I think that no one operates with a complete unbias (e.g. we are all biased towards ignorance).
I think the framing of the question in terms of impartiality leaks intos thinking of our interpretations in cultural societies, etc. perhaps it would be best to frame the question in relation to 'reality' and 'absolute truth.' Do these exist? Should our exegetical methods seek to relate to these as much as possible?
I think we all have our subjectivity, but to deny an ultimate objective reality is opprobrium.
I don't think exegesis exists in a vacuum, and it is certainly a possibility to bring biases to the table. That is where good study and careful thought about authorial intent, and a healthy dose of historical grammatical method should help to right our wrongs.
I enjoy this definition of truth, though modernistic:
“The word truth denotes something that conforms to actuality, is a faithful standard, or involves sincerity or integrity.” - D.K. Clark, “Truth” in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology
I see where there is a theological standoff to understanding hermenutical issues in regards to philosophical pre-understanding:
"Though not directly acknowledged, it advocated a major change in the way believers have understood divine revelation, at least since the Reformation and probably since the best days of the Garden of Eden. Thiselton advocated incorporating a new beginning point in the interpretation of Scripture, that of the preunderstanding of the interpreter. Prior to that, the interpreter sought for objectivity in interpretation, in letting the text speak for itself, without injecting personal bias. As innocent as this change may appear to be, it has utterly devastated evangelical hermeneutics for the last two decades. Subjectivism has become the rule rather than the exception, whereas prior to the focus on preunderstanding, the goal of exegetes was to learn what the text meant in its original setting." - Robert L. Thomas, “The Hermeneutics of Open Theism,” Master’s Seminary Journal 12:2 (Fall 2001): 184-5.
However, i think that Thiselton's point should be viewed as a lense to understand better the authorial intent, and interpreters' own biases, rather than a hostile attempt to assert meaning into a text.
I personally see extreme value in the historical grammatical approach to scripture. And I think a common sensical approach to scripture is alot closer to the original audience than existensialists, post-modernists, reader-responserizers, etc. To pretend that an interpreter cannot bring his own biases into the exegetical process of biblical theology seems to be folly (and i think that is Thiselton's point).
Good post Raja!
No
no
no
and no.
I think there is often the false dichotomy of objectivism vs. skepticism. I hope that you developed the alternative of perspectivism in your future posts.
I am puzzled by the R. Thomas quote in your response Hett., does he insinuate that just because the 'pre-modern' exegetes did not take account of there biases that they were not there? Hmm?
What are we to do with the biases that we are unaware of? How do we overcome things we are not yet conscience of?
Authorial Intention is a good goal to strive for, but it is nearly impossible to grasp, and how do we know when we grasp it?
Look forward to your future posts!
I don't think we are in any sense 'impartial', or are commanded to be. The commands are to charity, and honesty - not 'objectivity' as defined by neutrality. Neutrality is ultimately a sin or a pretense -probably both?
Charity rejoices in the truth, yet is not neutral. It has a definite predisposition to 'think no evil'. It is as involved as it possibly can be with its object. Honesty implies not getting rid of what we have stake, but simply owning up to it: a virtue very much in keeping with a subject.
If we are going to use 'neutrality' as the concept behind 'objectivity', then to be human is to be hopelessly subjective. We are creatures, contingent, and even more, we are a certain kind of creatures. We cannot even view things 'neutrally' through the perceptions of some other kind of created being, like a dog or a cat. We can only perceive out of the kind of being we are....
It seems like metalepsis is right, there has to be another alternative. If 'objectivity' has its reference point in the truth as it is in the being of God - & He is not 'neutral', how can neutrality be in any way aligned with truth? Is the unregenerate heart, which is at enmity with God, ever 'neutral'? Is the regenerate heart, in love with God, ever 'neutral'? Yet love or hatred to the Creator are the fundamental centers into which the conscious creature organizes everything. We are, fundamentally, a response. To be neutral, we would have to be autonomous.
As far as the interpretative process goes.... My tentative thoughts would be that God gives us the hermeneutical tools necessary to get at the more difficult places in the text. But I agree with hettinger (if I'm understanding right) that 'common sense' (not the same as neutral sense, rather it arises out of common human predispositions?) is generally the medium in which God is addressing us. He made us, He understands how to speak to us....
I'm not an expert on the corpus of either A. Thiselton or R. Thomas, it just seems to me that there is a wide divergence in their understandings. I thought it was apropos to the post. Thus, I'm looking forward to Raja's insight on subjectivism and interpretation, etc.
Perhaps I'm too simplistic in seeing pre-understanding, prejudice, bias, and disposition as inter-related.
I think authorial intent is not inaccessable in the majority of passages (the remainder deal with issues such as finite rational limitation, or similar). I think the original audience would of not had a problem (unless that was the author(s) intent: parables, prophecy). The major difference being for today's interpreters are areas such as time, culture, and language.
I imagine trying to explain the concept of farfegnugen to a first century interpreter. Is it possible? Yes. Would it be easy? No. There would be a slew of tertiary issues to deal with, such as 'what is an automobile.'
How do you know when they have grasped the concept? I suppose when their understanding of it jives with contextual usage. Similar to when you see someone misuses something in english.
How do we know when we grasp authorial intent? I think this keys into 'how do we know when our subjective understanding is aligned with reality?'
Unfortunately, when thinking about this, I find that many of my reasons/proofs for a absolute reality are very similar to arguments for a corporate societal perception based reality.
I guess a main difference being that I think the world would still exist if there was no society to percieve it.
"Theology which arises from exegesis remains the only gold standard for what can count as true knowledge of the Bible."
I really like how Vanhoozer puts the concept of "speech act" into play on the matter of reader involvement, which relates to "one's own subjective states, such as emotions, judgments, desires, past experiences, etc." I see this as realizing that perhaps the ultimate author intended to have an effect upon everyone who reads/understands his work.
Perhaps Raja will releases a blog set called Epistemology and the Word of God.
I don't have time to respond to these excellent comments at the moment, and it may be a few more days until my next post, but I wanted to briefly mention that I hold to the one-world interpretation of Kant (mostly because that's the one I'm familiar with through secondary literature, not because I've studied Kant in any great detail). Kant's view is essentially an empiricist one in practice, and it's miles from the skepticism of postmoderns like Rorty, as I understand it.
I’ve always wanted to ask the objectivists if they disregard the doctrinal statement they signed (at their respective institution or church) when they exegete.
Really interesting point, Jonathan. I think it illustrates the relationship between exegesis and theological commitment which seem to be mutually informing in interpretation.
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